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Introduction 
The adjudication of industrial disputes by independent public 
bodies is becoming an increasingly important feature of the industrial 
relations in developing countries. Among the Commonwealth countries alone, 
i. 
Aden, Ceylon, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda and Tanzania have established some sort of industrial courts 
in recent years."1" Their popularity, in large part, is a reflection of the 
dissatisfaction felt with some aspects of the existing system of voluntary 
collective bargaining for the determination of terms and conditions of employ-
2 
ment. Perhaps the most important motive behind the creation of industrial 
courts is the desire to reduce the incidence of strikes. In this respect, the 
industrial courts may be looked upon as a substitute for other ad hoc methods 
of governmental intervention for the settlement of industrial disputes such as 
the appointment of conciliation and investigation panels, and boards of inquiry. 
Industrial courts are preferred to such ad hoc methods in that they are 
expected to bring greater expertise and consistency to bear on the resolution 
of industrial disputes. Another and an increasingly important reason for the 
establishment of industrial courts is the realization that questions of wage 
levels and other conditions of employment have an importance transcending the 
interests of the two parties directly involved. This concern with the 
broader effects of individual wage decisions is usually reflected in the 
guide lines laid down for the court. These may either take the general form 
of requiring the court to take account of public interest, as in Australia 
and Singapore, or'-'the more specific form of detailed considerations that ought 
"We are indebted to Mr. Saeed Cockar, President of the Kenya Industrial Court, 
Mr. Clement Lubembe, Secretary-General of the Central Organization of Trade 
Unions (Kenya), Mr. Peter Dodds from the Federation of Kenya Employers, and 
a .number of employers and trade union leaders for valuable discussions on 
various aspects of the Industrial Court's work. More than ever, it is 
necessary to emphasise that we alone are responsible for the views expressed 
in this paper. 
to influence its decisions, as in Tanzania.^ 
Once established, the industrial courts exercise an important 
influence on both the pattern of industrial relations and the level of wages and 
conditions of service for- employees. The latter in turn have important 
implications for the distribution and growth of national income. In this 
paper, we have attempted to evaluate the economic impact of the decisions of 
one such institution - the Industrial Court of Kenya. Before coming to this 
evaluation, however, it is necessary to give a brief description of the origin5 
structure and operation of the industrial Court. 
Origin^ Structure and Operation. 
The Court was first established in July, 1954-, following the signing 
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of the Tripartite Agreement in February, 196!+. Section C of the Agreement 
stated, "An Industrial Court will be established forthwith to which all disputes 
unresolved by voluntary negotiating machinery will be referred for arbitration... 
Prior to the establishment of the Court, the resolution of trade disputes was 
governed by The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance of 1962. 
The Ordinance provided for the settlement of disputes through conciliation by 
the Labour Commissioner, and through Arbitration Tribunal and Board of Inquiry. 
The Trade Disputes Act of 1964- further strengthened the machinery of dispute 
settlement by the creation of the Industrial Court, but in all other respects 
left the old system essentially unchanged. The two main reasons for the 
establishment of the Court were the need to reduce the incidence of strikes 
and the provision of a regular and expert machinery for the settlement of 
industrial disputes 
The Court originally consisted of a President, appointed by the Chief 
Justice, one independent member appointed by the Minister of Labour, and one 
representative each from both the union and the management side. Later, as 
the volume of work increased, four additional members each from a panel of 
nominations from the Federation of Kenya Employers and the Kenya Federation of 
Labour were appointed by the Minister of Labour. In 1955, a new Trade Disputes 
Act was passed, which in addition to the presidency, created two positions of 
vice-presidents of the Court, and established two panels, each consisting of 7 ten members, representing employers and unions. 
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A Vice-President may act alone as chairman of the Court if so directed 
by the President, and panel members may be called upon by the President to 
assist him in making awards. Disputes may be brought to the Court either 
directly by the two parties, or indirectly by the Minister of Labour. The 
Minister may have recourse to a number of ways of settling the dispute. He 
may refer the dispute back to the parties, appoint a conciliator or a 
conciliation panel, order an investigation into the dispute through a committee 
of investigators or a board of inquiry, or refer it to the Industrial Court. 
Reference to the Industrial Court is tending increasingly to replace other 
methods of settlement of industrial disputes. The award made by the Court 
becomes "an implied term of every contract of employment between the employers 
and employees to whom the award relates".® Once accepted, it becomes binding 
on both the parties. There is no provision for appeal from awards of the 
Industrial Court to the High Court. Questions of interpretation of the 
Industrial Court decisions must be referred back to the Court itself. 
The Court is empowered to hear disputes in both the private and the 
public sectors and to make awards in respect of all employees with the exception 
9 
of those who might be classified as constituting the management. It has 
powers to adjudicate on a wide range of issues such as wages and salaries, 
pension schemes, gratuity, housing, leave, allowances of various sorts, hours 
of work, redundancy, severance pay etc. There was a rapid increase in the 
volume of work handled by the Court in the first two and half years: in the 
first six months of its operation, the Court heard a total of 18 cases; the 
corresponding figures for 1965 and 1966 were 65 and 89, falling to 49 in 1967. 
The 1967 and early 1968 figures indicate that the number of disputes heard bjr 
the Court might stabilise around 50 or so per year. The relatively large number 
of disputes brought before the Court in 1965 and 1966 reflected in part the 
end of the period of wage standstill following the termination of the Tripartite 
Agreement in April, 1965. But the subsequent improvement derives from two 
other factors as well: the increase in the length of the period for 
which awards are given, and the better use of the conciliation machinery 
before the dispute is taken to the Industrial Court. A case brought before 
the Court usually gets a hearing within a period of six weeks; the average 
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period between the first registration and the decision on a dispute has tended 
10 . to be about 90 days. The Kenya Industrial Court is fortunate m not having 
a considerable backlog of cases such as is coirmon in most other countries. 
Table 1(a) shows the sectoral distribution of the firms appearing 
before the Industrial Court over the period 1964-1967. As might be expected, 
well over 65% of the cases fall in two sectors - manufacturing and commerce. 
It is somewhat surprising to find that no firms in the construction industry 
have been involved in disputes before the Industrial Court. 
Table 1(a) 
Sectoral Distribution of Firms Involved in Industrial Court (I.C.) Cases, 
1964 - 1967 
Sector No. of I.C. Cases % of Total 
Manufacturing 82 44.8 
Commerce 38 20.7 
Services 23 12.6 
Government 16 8.7 
Agriculture 10 5.5. 
Transportation and Communication 9 4.9 
Mining 3 1.6 
Electricity and Water 2 1.1 
Building 0 0 
183a 100.0 
Source: Industrial Court Causes; 
a Out of the total recorded cases of 221 over the 1964-67 period, there were 
three decisions involving a total of 22 small engineering firms. Here 
they are recorded as 3 cases, and not 22 as in the official cause list. 
There are no Court records for 19 cases. 
Table 1(b) compares the sectoral distribution of industrial and 
commercial firms (excluding government and agriculture) appearing before 
the Industrial Court with that of all such firms in the country. It will 
be noticed that although manufacturing firms formed only a quarter of all 
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industrial and commercial firms in 1965, they accounted for well over half 
of all disputes heard by the Industrial Court. On the other hand, firms 
in the commerce and services sector are underrepresented in the hearings 
before the Court. The predominance of manufacturing can be explained by 
the relatively larger size and greater strength of trade unions in this 
sector. Conversely, the lower representation of firms in commerce and 
services and their complete absence in building and construction in the 
Industrial Court cases would apuear to be largely due to the smaller size 
of firms and relatively weak trade unions in these sectors. 
Table 1(b) 
A Comparison of the Sectoral Distribution of all Commercial and Industrial 
Firms, 1965 and those involved in I.C. Cases 
Sector: Number of % of Total % of 
all firms firms I.C. cases 
Manufacturing 6,991 24.8 52.2 
Commerce 9.655 42.2 24.2 
Services 5,667 30.5 14.7 
Transportation and Communication 301 1.3 5.7 
Mining 40 0.2 1.9 
Electricity and Water 9 - 1.2 
Building 236 1.0 0 
22,899 100.0 100.0 
Source: For all industrial and commercial firms, Statistical Abstract, 1956: 
for I.C. cases, see Table 1(a). 
It is of some interest to determine the size distribution of firms 
involved in Industrial Court cases. As this information is not easily 
available for all firms, we selected a sample of 37 firms which appeared before 
the Industrial Court in 1966-67. Table II shows the size distribution of all 
industrial and commercial firms along with that of the 37 firms in our sample. 
While 84% of the total number of firms have four or fewer employees, none of 
the firms in our sample employed less than five persons. Conversely, while 
less than 3% of all firms employed 50 or more persons, over 70% of the firms in 
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our sample fall in this category. This predominance of large and medium sized 
firms in the disputes appearing before the Industrial Court is undoubtedly to-
be explained by the superior strength and organisation of the trade unions 
in these firms. 
Table II 
Size Distribution of firms appearing before the Industrial Court, and of all 
Commercial and Industrial firms, 1965 . 
No. of Firms No. of Employees 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10 - 19 20 - 49 50 + Total 
All Commercial and 
Industrial firms 19,207 1,474 942 754 517 22894 
% of total 83.9 6.4 4.1 3.3 2.3 100.0 
Sample of Industrial 
Court cases in 1966 
and 1967 0 2 3 6 26 37 
% of total 0 5.4 8.1 16.2 70.3 100.0 
Sources: 1965 size distribution of firms, Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1966. 
The Industrial Court sample was compiled from the Federation of Kenya Employers 
(F.K.E.) records; of the 4-8 disputes involving wages in 1966 and 1967, the 
F.K.E. had employment records for 37 firms only. 
Analysis of the Industrial Court decisions. 
We turn now to an analysis of the Industrial Court decisions. The 
decisions of the Court are generally published in a summary form; they contain 
information on the issues in distmte, the submissions of the two parties to the 
dispute, and the award itself. Only in a minority of cases is information 
published on the old and new wage rates, the number of employees in the various 
categories, and the reasons for the award. In no cases is information published 
on prices, production costs etc. We have had, therefore, to supplement the 
published information through questionnaires and interviews with a small sample 
of firms. Even so, it was not possible to obtain all the information necessary 
for a complete economic analysis of the decisions of the Industrial Court. 
We shall, therefore»confine ourselves to an evaluation of the impact of the 
Court decisions on the level and structure of wages, fringe benefits, and 
the incidence of strikes. 
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a) Level and Structure of Wages. 
As might be expected, wages have been the most frequent issue among 
the disputes brought before the Industrial Court: during the period 1964-67, 
100 out of a total of 221 cases were concerned with wages. As Table III shows, 
out of these 100 cases, nil award was given in only 4 cases, three of which 
occurred during the wage standstill agreement of 1964. It would, therefore, 
appear that once a dispute is brought before the Industrial Court, there is 
the virtual certainty of a wage increase. Another important characteristic of 
the Court wage awards has been their progressive nature i.e. the relative 
I 
increase m wages declines with increasing wages. Table III shows the 
classification of wage awards by this criterion. It would be seen that well 
over -80% of the known wage awards have been progressive, and a little less 
than 7% regressive. The progressive nature of the Court's awards is in part 
a reflection of its deliberate policy to reduce wage differentials among 
workers of varying skills. But it also results from the common, administratively 
convenient practice of awarding a flat wage rate increases to most categories 
of employees, usually 20 to 30 shillings per month. The Court decisions have, 
therefore, over the years contributed to a considerable squeezing of wage 
differentials. 
Table III 
Industrial Court Wage Cases 
1964 1965 1966 1967 Total 
No. % Mo. % No. % No. % No. % 
Nil 3 33.3 0 0 1 3.2 0 0 4 4 
Neutral 0 0 4 10 1 3.2 1 5 6 6 
Progressive 5 55.5 27 67.5 24 77.4 14 70 70 70 
Regressive 0 0 3 7.5 3 9.7 0 0 6 6 
Unknown 1 11.1 6 15 2 6.4 5 25 14 14 
Total 9 99.9 40' 100 31 99.9 20 100 100 100 
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It is possible to investigate three further properties of the 
Industrial Court wage decisions: the range of relative wage increases, the 
median wage rate increases, and the duration of the award. Table IV below 
shows the range of relative wage rate increases for the lowest and the middle 
level category of workers. 
Table IV 
Range of Relative Wage Rate Increases: Per-centages. 
Lowest category medium category 
1965 3.8 to 38.5 3.3 to 30.0 
1966 0 to 41.6 0 to 33.0 
1967 10.0 to 17.0 ' 6.7 to 10,-8 
The lowest category represents the increase given to workers receiving 
the lowest wage in each Court case thus representing unskilled labour. The 
medium category represents the increases given to workers receiving the median 
wage in each case, unless there were an even number of wage categories, in 
which case the category chosen was the one of the two middle categories that 
had the percentage increase nearest the average for the entire case. 
The one important point that emerges from the table is that there 
has been a distinct reduction in the range of wage rate increases in 1967,-
with an increase in the minimum and a reduction in the maximum; this is true 
of both the lowest and the medium category of workers. This reduction in the 
range of wage rate increases has been matched by a similar reduction in 
unweighted average wage rate increases. Table V below shows these increases 
for different years for the two categories of workers distinguished above. 
Table V 
Percentage Increases in Average Wage Awards: 
Lowest category Medium category 
1965 16.3 12.6 
1966 14.1 10.2 
1967 12.3 8.7 
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This effect has been further intensified by a progressive increase- in -the 
duration of the award, as shorn in Table VI. 
Table VI 





This has resulted in a further effective reduction of average wage rate 
increases on a per annum basis, as shown in Table VII. 
Table VII 
Relative wage rate increases per annum: percent 
Lowest category Medium category 
1965 15.8 12.2 
1966 10.4 7.5 
1967 7.2 5.1 
These figures thus show that there has been quite a substantial effective 
reduction in wage rate increases awarded by the Court over the period 1965-67. 
For both categories of workers, the average wage rate increases in 1967 were 
well below half the 1965 figure. With the current practice of making two 
year awards, the above trend towards lower wage rate increases seems to be 
continuing. To what extent is the progressive reduction in wage rate increases 
a conscious policy decision by the Industrial Court? In order to answer this 
question fully, it is necessary to say something about the criteria employed 
by the Court in its wage decisions. 
Criteria for Wage Decisions. 
Unlike arbitration bodies in some other countries, the Industrial 
Court in Kenya has not been issued with any criteria to be applied to its 
wage awards. This leaves the Court with considerable freedom and flexibility 
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in devising its own criteria for wage determination. As the Court does not 
normally give reasons for its awards, these criteria can only be deduced 
from its decisions. From a study of its decisions, at least in the early 
years - till the end of 1966 - it would appear that the Court has interpreted 
its role as consisting essentially of facilitating the process of bargaining, 
and making awards which would be acceptable to both parties. Given this 
objective, it would clearly have been inconvenient to have been tied to a 
rigid criteria of wage determination. Nevertheless, a study of wage awards 
shows that the Court has followed certain broad guide lines in its wage decisions. 
These may be summarized as follows: 
i) Living Wage 
The concept of "living11, or "decent" or "fair" wage is applied to 
1 o 
the firms and industries where wages are particularly depressed. By its 
very nature, it is difficult to specify a single figure which constitutes 
living wage. This would vary from area to area, but in general is likely to 
be in the neighbourhood of the legal minima for different areas. 
ii) Cost of Living 
If (i) is not relevant, then the Court attempts to make an award 
which not only compensates workers for any increases in the cost of living, 
but results in a real increase in their standard of living. This is made 
clear in the following quotation from one of the Court's decisions: "The 
Court has to consider various factors before a wage increase is granted. An 
increase in the cost of living is only one of such factors. One of the other 
important factors which cannot be overlooked is that the worker should be able 
to get something more than the compensation for the loss of money value, in 
order to move towards the ultimate objective of enjoying a higher standard 
of living. But this can be granted only if under competitive conditions an 
industry can be shown to be capable of paying a full living wage. This has 
further got to be consistent with the growth of the economy in the country 13 
and its Development Plan." The latter part of the above statement makes 
clear that the exact amount by which living standards are to be improved 
is determined largely by what might be called the "ability to pay" of the 
firm or industry in question. 
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iii) Ability to pay. 
This criterion has become increasingly important in influencing the 
decisions of the industrial Court. This is evident not only from the trend 
towards smaller wage rate increases, particularly in 1967, but also from 
the pronouncements made by the Court itself. In the context of wage decisions, 
the ability to pay criterion may be given the following interpretations: 
a) wage award must not be such as to lead to a closure of the business."1"4 
b) it should not lead to a significant price rise. 
c) it should not result in a reduction in employment. 
It is not contended here that these considerations have completely detsmtined 
the Industrial Court wage decisions in recent months, but simply that the 
Court has paid increasing attention to these factors. Employment implications 
of wage awards have always weighed heavily with the Court, but this concern 
was given a particularly forceful expression in the recent Industrial Court 
decision on a dispute between the Kenya Plantation, and Agricultural Workers® 
Union and the Kenya Tea Growers' Association. In the course of making its 
award, the Court stated: 
There are extremely far reaching considerations at stake in this 
dispute as there is no denying the fact that a person working on 
the land in comparison with other workers receives very inferior 
wages and benefits. The Claimant's arguments in this respect are 
valid. But the most formidable problem in Kenya is that of 
unemployment. The Government has made it abundantly clear that 
its policy was to increase employment even if this meant the 
application of some form of brake on wage increases. 
It is clear that in making these remarks the Court had been impressed 
by the employers' arguments that the past wage increases had had adverse 
effects on the volume of employment in the tea industry. r,he trend towards 
smaller wage rate increases and greater sensitivity to the broader economic 
effects of individual wage awards reflects in large part the continuing 
concern throughout East Africa with employment expansion and reduction of 
rural-urban income differentials.15 But in the absence of a detailed 
articulation of an official incomes policy, the Court's primary objective 
must naturally continue to be to arrive at compromise decisions which would 
be acceptable to both the parties. 
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Effect on Wage Levels 
Finally, before turning to other economic aspects of the Industrial 
Court decisions, we must assess the impact of its wage awards on the process 
of wage determination. More specifically, we must attempt an answer to the 
question as to whether the Industrial Court has introduced an upward bias in 
the machinery of wage determination. It is here necessary to point out that 
the impact of the Court decisions is not confined to the relatively small 
17 
proportion of employees directly affected. The Court awards are often 
taken as a norm by related firms and industries, and often their influence 
extends even further. 
Some a priori considerations would indicate that the Court awards 
have affected the process of wage determination in the upward direction. 
We have argued above that the Court has interpreted its role as consisting 
essentially of facilitating the process of bargaining. Its decisions, 
therefore, per force had been influenced by the need to reach a quick settle-
ment of the dispute, acceptable to both the parties. This, coupled with the 
relatively greater political power of the trade unions and the need to ensure 
their acceptance of the award, can be expected to introduce an upward bias 
in wage awards. The awards made by the Court in its earlier years seem to 
have been influenced by such considerations. It is, however, likely that 
their importance has declined in more recent decisions. Even if this argument 
did not hold, it would seem that the 'demonstration effect" of the Court 
awards might have had the effect of pulling the general wage structure upwards. 
Most of the firms appearing before the Court are relatively large and have 
strong trade unions. It would appear that the wage awards won by employees 
in such firms exercise a strong impact on wages in smaller, less favourably 
endowed firms in the same industry. Often these awards are regarded by the 
trade unions as the minimum or appropriate awards for all firms in the 
industry, and carry the moral authority of the Court decision. 
Unfortunately we do not have adequate data to test empirically 
the effect of the Court wage awards on the level and structure of wages. 
Such evidence as is available would appear to support the hypothesis that 
the Court awards have introduced an upward bias in the process of wage 
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determination. When the managements of the 13 firms in our sample were 
asked the question whether the Court award was higher or lower than they 
18 would have granted in free negotiations, their replies were as follows. 
Higher - 5 
Same - 5 
Lower - 1 
Not known - 2 
This might suggest that the Court awards have introduced an upward bias in 
wage determination. However, it must be remembered that these are employers' 
opinions. A similar poll conducted among the trade union representatives 
would undoubtedly come out with a contrary conclusion. 
Some further evidence on the question is provided in Table VIII 
which compares the Industrial Court wage awards with the relative increase 
in earnings of employees in selected sectors of the economy. 
Table VIII 
Comparison of wage awards and relative increase in earnings in the whole economy 
Industrial Court: p.a. For the Whole Economy 
Lowest Medium All Sectors Private Sector Commerce Manuf. Services 
exc. Agric. 
1961 - 11.7 11.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1962 0.6 1.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1963 12.2 15.2 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1964a -
1965 15 .8 12.2 7.9 7.2 10.0 5.4 7 .3 
1966 10 .4 7.5 10.4 10.5 7.1 14.2 3 .5 
1967 7 .2 5 .1 3.7 - 3.1 15 .0 2.5 1 .6 
Source . Table VII for Industrial Court awards; Economic Survey, various 
years for others 
a. No calculations have been made for 1964 because of a change in the 
coverage of employees during the year
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These figures are not completely comparable, as the relative wage increases 
in Industrial Court cases are average awards for lowest and medium level 
wage groups; they are not weighted by the number of employees in these 
categories in individual firms; nor do -they refer to all employees. The 
earnings figures, on the other hand, show average increase in earnings of 
all employees. If we disregard this difficulty, we notice that for the 
period 1965-67 the average increase in wage rates awarded by the Industrial 
Court to lowest wage earners is in excess of the increase in earnings in all 
relevant sectors of the economy. The increase in average wages awarded to 
medium level employees by the Industrial Court over the same period is exceeded 
only by the relative increase in the earnings of employees in the commerce 
sector. Thus wage increases awarded by the Industrial Court are higher than 
the incrasse in average wages of all employees or of employees in the relevant 
19 
sectors with the possible exception of commerce. 
This, however, is not necessarily a conclusive evidence in favour of 
the hypothesis that the Court awards have exercised an upward influence on the 
general level of wages. Quite apart from the statistical difficulties noted 
above, our figures clearly do not and cannot demonstrate that the average 
wage rates in the firms appearing before the Industrial Court would have 
risen by less if wages had been determined by voluntary negotiations. Never-
theless, it would be reasonable to conclude from the theoretical arguments 
and the available empirical evidence that-the Industrial Court introduced an 
Upward bias in the process of wage determination in Kenya over the period 
1965-67. 
Fringe Benefits 
We have not been able to study the Industrial Court decisions on 
fringe benefits in any great detail. Nevertheless, some generalisations 
can be made on the basis of a limited examination of the Court awards. In 
general, the Court appears to have been less generous in its awards on fringe 
benefits than in its wage awards; nil awards are quite common. It has, 
however, attempted to achieve greater uniformity for some important items of 
fringe benefits than in wage awards. For paid leave the Court in 1964 and 1965 
made both 18 and 21 day awards, but in 1966 began to grant only 21 day awards, 
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with slightly longer leave periods for some employees with seniority. 
Nevertheless, this represents only a slight increase in Court award levels. 
The rates for overtime work have tended to be standardised: lj times the 
normal rate for ordinary overtime, and twice the normal rate for Sunday 
and holiday overtime work. With respect to hours of work, although nil 
awards have exceeded the awards shortening the work week by two and a half 
times, the general trend has been towards a reduction in hours of work per 
week. The norm in 1954- and 1965 was hours per week, but in the subsequent 
decisions there has been an increasing tendency towards awards of 42 hours 
per week - e.g. about one-half of late 1966 and 1967 awards have been for 
a 42 hours week. This in effect amounts to an increase in wages of about 
4.5%. Decisions on most other fringe benefits vary a good deal and show 
no common trend.. Thus the effect of decisions on fringe benefits has been 
to further increase the real income of wage earners, though the increase 
appears to have been a relatively small one. 
Strikes 
It was noted earlier that an important reason for the creation of 
the Industrial Court was to reduce the incidence of strikes. And indeed, as 
Table IX below shows, there has been an impressive decrease in both the number 
of strikes and man-days lost since 1963; the 1967 figure for man-days lost 
20 is less than half the 1963 figure. 
Table IX 
Number of Strikes and Man-Days Lost 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
No. of 
Strikes 96 67 232 167 285 230 221 200 155 138 
Mandays lost 59,096 431,.973 757,860 120,454 745,799 235,000 167,767 345,855 144,253 109,1 
Source: Annual Report, 1965, Ministry of Labour: Annual Report, 1967, Federation 
of Kenya Employers. 
It is, however, difficult to say to what extent the Court is responsible for 
this improvement in industrial relations. In the first place, it must be 
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noted that the really significant improvement from the immediately pre-
independence years of heavy industrial strife took place in 1963 before 
the establishment of the Industrial Court. Two developments contributed to 
this improvement: the formulation of an "Industrial Relations Charter" in 
21 
late 1962, and the achievement of internal self-government in mid-1963. 
The former did much to establish proper procedures for the settlement of 
industrial disputes, and the latter contributed by promoting political 
stability and a greater sense of involvement by trade unions in the running 
of the country. Similarly, the remarkable reduction in the number of strikes 
and man-days lost since 1963 is largely attributable to two factors: (a) 
a greater sense of restraint and responsibility encouraged by the government 
on both sides of the industry. In particular, there seems to have been an 
improvement in the attitude of employers towards their employees and trade 
unions, in part due to the efforts of the Federation of Kenya Employers (F.K.E.). 
Also, reduced friction and greater unity in the trade union movement brought 
about through the creation of the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU) 
has enabled greater control to be exercised by the Unions over unauthorized 
strikes: in addition, COTU, like the FKF., has encouraged better union-
management relations, (b) But perhaps of even greater importance are the 
provisions of the Trade Disputes Acts of 1964 and 1965 with respect to strikes 
and lockouts. The Minister of Labour is empoowered by the 1965 Act to prohibit 
arbitrary strike or lockout action. The Minister may declare a strike or 
lockout (actual or threatened) unlawful if the parties have not exhausted 
their negotiating machinery or where there is an agreement or award regulating 
the matters under dispute or, furthermore, where the action is sympathetic and 
22 
not related to a dispute with the employees' own industry. Strikes in the 
essential services are subject to even greater restrictions. At the same 
time the Trade Disputes Acts strengthened the machinery for conciliation and 
arbitration, including the creation of the Industrial Court. The contribution 
made by the Court to industrial harmony cannot, therefore, be judged in 
isolation from the new system for the settlement of industrial disputes brought 
into being by the two Trade Disputes Acts. Judged as a part of the new system, 
there can be little doubt that the Industrial Court has made a major contribution 
in recent years to the reduction in man-days lost through strikes. 
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Conclusion 
Judged by the purpose for which it was originally created - an 
independent instrument for the settlement of industrial disputes - the 
Industrial Court has been an outstanding success. It has won the support 
and respect of the government, the employers and the trade unions. In 
general the attitude of employers towards the Court is quite favourable. Of 
the 13 firms interviewed by us, 12 stated that they were satisfied with the 
wage decisions of the Court involving their firm. Likewise, most trade union 
leaders have expressed satisfaction with the working of the Industrial Court. 
The following policy statement by the COTU (K) indicates the official taade 
union attitude towards the Court: 
"The COTU (K) supports the existing legislation for industrial 
arbitration. It believes that the operation of the Industrial Court has 
wholesome effect upon labour relations. COTU (K) shall continue to give its 
23 
backing to fair arrangements designed to foster industrial peace..." 
The remarkable support enjoyed by the Court from both sides of 
the industry may be attributed to three main factors. Perhaps the most 
important of these is the reputation for independence and impartiality the 
Court has acquired since its inception. Both employers and trade unions feel 
that the Court is "fair" and "impartial" in its deliberations and decisions. 
This feeling in turn derives from the ability of the Court to identify common 
ground between employers and trade unions, and to achieve compromise solutions 
acceptable to both parties. Another reason for the popularity of the Court, 
particularly with the employers, derives from the widespread belief that the 
Court has made an important contribution to the reduction of strikes and 
mandays lost. Finally, the success of the Court is no small measure due to 
the personality of its President who has not only achieved the support of both 
the union and business communities, but also has expertly guided the Court 
from its infancy when its future was uncertain into a smoothly functioning body 
that now seems destined to continue to play a major role in Kenya's system of 24 industrial relations. 
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Despite its undoubted success, it would appear that a number of 
minor uncontroversial reforms could further strengthen the effectiveness 
of the Industrial Court. Increasingly the disputes are brought to the 
Court only after prior attempts at conciliation by the Ministry of Labour 
officials have failed. It would appear that an improvement in the quality 
of the conciliation personnel could further reduce the number of cases coming 
before the Court. Secondly, the system would function more efficiently if 
the President of the Court had the power to discipline people, possibly by 
committing them for contempt of Court. This may be expected to lead to a 
marked improvement in punctuality, general observance of the Court procedures, 
and in presentation of the cases by the two parties. Thirdly, the authority 
of the Court would be enhanced if its awards could be made binding on both 
the parties, as is presently the case with awards in disputes involving 
"essential services". Finally, the quality of the decisions made by the 
Industrial Court could be improved if it had access to expert advice on 
technical economic and statistical matters. Under the present system, the 
Court has to rely on its own evaluation of the information provided by the 
parties to the dispute. 
Owing to limitations of time and expertise, the Court is naturally 
unable to give full consideration to all the economic issues involved in 
each case. The expert advice could be obtained either by attaching a small 
staff of economists, statisticians, and accountants to the Court, or by making 
available to it the expertise that already exists in government ministries 
and independent research bodies. The latter solution is more economical of 
manpower and will at the same time ensure that the government policy is duly 
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taken into account in the deliberations of the Court. 
There would appear to be considerable support from both sides of the 
industry for the above reforms in the Industrial Court. The same, however, 
cannot be said for the suggestion that the Court should formulate and implement 
a coherent well-thought out incomes policy. It was noted earlier that the 
Court has served largely as an adjunct to the machinery of collective 
bargaining. Although it has paid increasing attention in recent years to 
the wider economic and social implications of its awards, there is nothing 
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in its constitution or terms of service which requires it to do so. And 
indeed such a view of its functions could seriously jeopardise its effective-
ness in resolving industrial disputes. Although the government has on a 
number of occasions outlined the broad aims of public policy in this field, 
it has not so far articulated a detailed incomes and prices policy. If and 
when such a policy were formulated, the Industrial Court could serve as an 
instrument of its implementation. The Court starts with some important 
advantages. It enjoys the confidence of both sides of the industry, has 
obtained valuable experience in the field of industrial relations, and is 
becoming increasingly sensitive to the broader social and economic implications 
of individual wage awards. Nevertheless, an assumption of a role of this sort 
would imply fundamental changes in the nature and objectives of the Court. 
It would transform it from an independent peace keeping body into an instrument 
for the imposition of government policy on wages and prices. This is bound to 
lead to a revision of the trade union attitudes towards the Court, and to a 
reluctance to carry the disputes to the Court. In addition, if it is to 
exercise some influence on wage rate increases throughout the economy, the 
Court will need to be invested with powers to approve all wage agreements, even 
those arrived at through voluntary, collective bargaining, in order to ensure 
compliance with the criteria for wage increases laid down by the government. 
This would clearly make the work of the Court more difficult and controversial; 
and its success in this role would be determined less by its own competence 
and understanding of industrial relations than by the success of the government 
in persuading the country, particularly the trade unions and the employers, 
of the need for such a policy. 
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F Q O T N O T E S 
1. The dates of their establishment are: Ceylon (1950), Singapore (1960), 
Kenya (1964), Uganda (1964), Trinidad (1965), and Tanzania (1967). A 
brief,, comparative discussion of some of these courts will be found in a 
pamphlet issued by the Organization of Employers' Federations and Employers 
in Developing Countries, Industrial Courts in Developing Countries, (London, 
1967) . 
2. Some of the reasons for the inappropriateness of the voluntary, collective 
bargaining in developing countries are discussed in H.A. Turner, Wage Trends, 
Wage Policies and Collective Bargaining: the Problems for Underdeveloped 
Countries, (Cambridge, 1966): and Peter Kilby, Industrial Relations and Wage 
Determination: Failure of the Anglo-Saxon Model, in the Journal of Developing 
Areas, pp. 489-519: July 1967. 
3. The development of the notion of "public interest" as interpreted by the Courts 
in Australia and Singapore is discussed in two articles by Paul L. Kleinsorge, 
Public Interest as a Criterion in Settling Labour Disputes: The Australian 
Experience, Journal of Industrial Relations, July 1964, pp. 1-22; and, 
Singapore's Industrial Arbitration Court: Collective Bargaining with 
Compulsory Arbitration in Industrial and Labour Relations Review, July 1964, 
pp. 551-565. 
For Tanzania, see The Permanent Labour Tribunal Act, 1967, Parts II 
and V.. 
4. For more details on all this, see the following articles: D. J. Musch, 
The Kenya Industrial Court, East Africa Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 266-280: 
S. Cockar, The Industrial Court and Labour Relations in Kenya, East Africa 
Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 257-65; F. Livingstone, The Government, the 
Worker and the Law in Kenya, East Africa Law Journal, pp. 
5. This was an agreement between the government, employers and trade unions in 
Kenya. It reflected the government's concern with rapidly mounting unemployment 
in the years immediately prior to independence. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, the Government undertook to increase its employment by 15%, the employers 
by 10%, and the trade unions accepted a policy of wage standstill for a year. 
After the expiry of one year period, the agreement was extended by another two 
months, See, Agreement on Measures for the Immediate Relief of Unemployment; 
in Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Annual Report, 1964, Republic of Kenya., 
6. In the course of debates on the Trade Disputes Act, 1964, Mr. Odero-Jowi, 
the Parliamentary Secretary for Labour and Social Services, stated, 
"Experience has shown that not all disputes are amenable to arbitration or 
inquiry... We find that the best solution to some of these disputes is an 
Industrial Court. Moreover, we think that an Industrial Court would be the 
final and impartial channel for settling disputes, so that we minimize the 
impact of strikes." Official Report, the National Assembly, Vol. II, pp. 911-12; 
17th March 1964. 
Mboya, then the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, stated; 
"... in the past, we relied entirely on some ad hoc machinery which consisted 
of appointing an arbitrator from time to time... at times when you needed a 
very specialized person and could not get him, you had to accept the services 
of a second best ... By setting up a permanent Court, we will be able to 
appoint persons who are capable and who will be available... when matters 
should be referred to them... we will be able to build up a body of 
precedence that can be used in most of the cases as they arise...". Ibid, 
pp. 968-69. 
7. The Trade Disputes Act, 1965, Part III, section 9. 
8. Ibid , section 10. 
9. The only other group of employees excluded from the jurisdiction- of the 
Industrial Court are those employed (a) in a military, naval or air force, 
or in reserve force thereof; (b) in a police force, tribal police force, 
or prison service, or in the National Youth Service, or in reserve force or 
service thereof..."; section 3, Trade Disputes Act, 1965. 
- 21 -
10. D. J. Musch, op. cit., p. 266. 






The Court would probably made an award for all five grades, either a flat 
increase for all grades, or a different increase for each grade. Here Grade I 
would appear as the lowest category, and Grade III as the medium category, 
in Table IV. 
12. This criterion was explicitly stated to have influenced the Court decision 
in the following causes: No. 3 of 1964, No. 21 and 24 of 1965. 
13. Cause No. 89 of 1966, quoted in Industrial Courts in Developing Countries, 
op . cit ., p. 10 . 
14. See recent Court cases 76 of 1966, 12 of 1967, and 30 of 1967.; 
15. Cause No. 40 of 1967. 
16. In this connection, see The Report to the Government of the United Republic 
of Tanzania on Wages, Incomes and Prices Policy, by International Labour 
Office (Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1967), and the accompanying White 
Paper on Wages, Incomes, Rural Development, Investment and Price Policy 
(Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1967). These issues are discussed in 
the Kenya context in D.P. Ghai, Incomes Policy in Kenya: Need, Criteria and 
Machinery, East African Economics Review, June, 1968 . In his Budget speech, 
18 June, 1968, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Gichuru, stated that the Kenya 
Government intends soon to introduce an incomes policy in the country. See 
also, J. R. Harris and M.P. Todaro "Urban Unemployment in East Africa: An 
Economic Analysis of Policy Alternatives," East African Economic Review, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, December 1968. 
17. In 1967, approximately 65,000 employees were directly affected by the Court 
decisions. This represents 10.9% of the total recorded employment, and 
about 16.3% of private recorded employment. Since, however, only about 50% of 
the latter is unionised, the numbers affected by the Court decisions amount 
to about 32.5% of the union members. The 1967 figures, however, were swollen 
because of the inclusion of tea workers in Cause No. 40 of 1967. 
18. The 13 firms selected were located in or around Nairobi and Mombasa; they 
represent a considerable range in commodities, and number of employees. Since 
the firms were questioned on 1966 and 1967 awards, which tended to be lower 
than 1964-65 awards, our sample, if anything understates the proportion of 
employees who feel that the Court awards have been higher than they would 
have given in free negotiations. 
19. We have understated the increase in wage rates awarded by the Industrial Court 
by our failure to include in it the effects of decisions on fringe benefits. 
These effects are included in the figures on average earnings of all employees. 
20. The rise in the number of man-days lost in 1965 was due to the occurrence 
of a few strikes by large unions such as Railway African Union, Kenya 
Distributive and Commercial Workers Union, The Kenya National Union of 
Teachers, and the Union of Posts and Telecommunications Employees (Kenya). 
21. This was drawn up in September, 1963, by a tripartite Industrial Relations 
Conference, consisting of the Minister of Labour, representatives of the 
Federation of Kenya Employers and the Kenya Federation of Labour. The text of 
the Charter is reprinted in B.C. Roberts and L. Greyfie de Bellecombe, 
Collective Bargaining in African Countries, (Macmillan, London, 1967), 
pp. 131-137. 
- 22 -
22. Livingstone, op. cit. p. 
23. A Statement of Policy issued by the Central Organization of Trade Unions (Kenya), 
8 November, 1966 (mimeo), p. 1. 
24-. For an outline of Mr. Cockar's approach to the Industrial Court and labour 
problems, see his article "The Industrial Court and Labour Relations in 
Kenya", in the East African Law Journal Vol. 2, 1966 pp. 257-265. 
25. The Permanent Labour Tribunal in Tanzania is permitted, indeed expected, to 
seek advice from any government officer or department, or any other outside 
body which has the necessary expertise. 
